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The trend of yields on institutional investments has become a matter of consider-
able importance for an increasing number of people. The growth of institutional
assets has been widely publicized in recent years, but little has been said about the
ultimate ownership of this wealth. The fact is that the ownership of the resources
of financial institutions becomes more widespread every year. There are now
estimated to be some 83 million life insurance policyholders as compared with 64
million in 1938, 53 million in 1927, and only io million in goo. There are nearly 15
million regular mutual savings bank accounts as compared with 12 million in 1938-
earlier data are not available. The increase in the number of savers and investors
in savings and loan associations is even more impressive. The 1936 total was 4.3
million. By i95o the total had increased to xo.7 million. Comparable figures on the
ownership of commercial bank deposits apparently are not available, but these too
have undoubtedly increased substantially in recent years.
This paper will first review the trend of yields on the investments of life insurance
companies, commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and savings and loan associa-
tions, and then consider the implications of these trends in the light of the growth
of institutional assets and their increasingly widespread ultimate ownership.
LIFE INsURANCE COMPANIES
The net investment yield on life company funds is available from the Institute of
Life Insurance from 1915 to date. The high point in this series, 5.18 per cent, was
reached in 1923, after which a persistent decline set in which lasted for more than 20
years. At the low point in x947, the net investment yield of the United States com-
panies averaged only 2.88 per cent, slightly more than half of the yield earned in
1923. The moderate recovery since 1947 still leaves the investment return at his-
torically depressed levels. Table I shows the record from 1915 through 195o.
The decline in the rate of investment earnings from i923 through 1947, particu-
larly since the early thirties, was the result of an insufficient demand for investible
funds as well as the "easy money" policy of the Federal Government. Actually,
a fundamentally weak situation from the standpoint of the lender was gradually
developing throughout the i92o's, and this weakness became apparent when the
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TABLE I
NET RATES OF INTEREST EARNED ON INvEsTED FuNDs, 1915-1950
ALL U. S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
Year Rate Year Rate Year Rate
1915 ................... 4.77% 1927 .................. 5.05% 1939 .................. 3.54%
1916 ................... 4.80 1928 .................. 5.05 1940 .................. 3.45
1917 ................... 4.81 1929 .................. 5.05 1941 .................. 3.41
1918 ................... 4.72 1930 .................. 5.05 1942 .................. 3.40
1919 ................... 4.66 1931 .................. 4.93 1943 .................. 3.29
1920 ................... 4.83 1932 .................. 4.65 1944 .................. 3.19
1921 ................... 5.02 1933 .................. 4.25 1945 .................. 3.07
1922 ................... 5.12 1934 .................. 3.92 1946 .................. 2.92
1923 ................... 5.18 1935 .................. 3.70 1947 .................. 2.88
1924 ................... 5.17 1936 .................. 3.71 1948 .................. 2.96
1925 ................... 5.11 1937 .................. 3.69 1949 .................. 3.04
1926 ................... 5.09 1938 .................. 3.59 1950 .................. 3.09
Source: Institute of Life Insurance: Lm INsURAcE FACT Boo, 1951, 50.
Note: The net interest rate is the ratio of the net investment income for the year to the mean ledger assets decreased by one-half the
net investment income.
easy money policy of the i93o's was launched. Demand for capital in the private
economy did not respond to the lure of depressed interest rates. Instead, vast
waves of refunding engulfed the market for outstanding obligations and the insur-
ance companies found themselves investing, in addition to their newly acquired
funds, an increasing inflow of cash arising from the turnover of their existing mort-
gage and security holdings.
Apart from its direct effect on interest rates, the languishing demand for invest-
ment funds in the private economy caused the life insurance companies to invest
an increasing proportion of their assets in United States Government bonds, the
volume of which was being expanded by deficit financing, thus reducing still more
the yield on their funds. The outbreak of war in 1941 greatly speeded up this process.
As shown in Table 2, 46 per cent of the assets of all United States companies were
invested in United States Government bonds by the end of the war. The subsequent
decline in this proportion to 2i per cent in I95O, coupled with the enormous demand
for capital funds from private sectors of the economy in the postwar period, was
largely responsible for the modest improvement in investment yields over the past
few years.
No breakdown of investment yields by lines of enterprise is available for the
entire life insurance business. However, a study of the bond investments, by lines
of enterprise, of the I8 largest United States life companies is available for the years
1929 through 1950. In addition the Investment Research Program of the Life
Insurance Association of America has developed some data on mortgage yields.
Table 3 shows yields on bonds, by lines of enterprise, for the i8 largest United
States life companies for the years 1929-i95o. These are gross yields-that is, yields
before the deduction of investment expenses-and are based on portfolios valued
at actual cost rather than book value. It should be noted that the yield on Govern-
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TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS, 1921-1950
ALL U. S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
(Dollar amounts in billions)
Securities
U. S. All other of business
Year Gov't Gov't and Real Policy Misc.
End securities bonds industry Mortgages estate loans assets Total
1921 ..... $0.8 11% $0.7 9% $1.9 24% $2.8 35% $0.2 2% $1.1 13% $0.4 6% $7.9 100%
1922 ..... 0.9 10 0.7 8 2.1 25 3.1 36 0.2 2 1.1 13 0.5 6 8.7 109
1923 ..... 0.8 9 0.7 7 2.3 25 3.7 39 0.2 3 1.2 13 0.5 5 9.5 100
1924 ..... 0.7 7 0.6 6 2.7 26 4.2 40 0.2 2 1.3 13 0.6 5 10.4 100
1925 ..... 0.7 6 0.7 6 3.1 27 4.8 42 0.3 2 1.4 13 0.6 5 11.5 100
1926 ..... 0.5 4 0.7 5 3.5 27 5.6 43 0.3 2 1.6 12 0.8 6 12.9 100
1927 .... 0.5 3 0.7 5 4.0 28 6.2 43 0.4 2 1.8 12 0.9 6 14.4 100
1928 ..... 0.4 3 0.8 5 4.6 29 6.8 42 0.4 3 2.0 13 1.0 6 16.0 100
1929 ..... 0.3 2 1.0 6 4.9 28 7.3 42 0.5 3 2.4 14 1.1 6 17.5 100
1930 ..... 0.3 2 1.1 6 5.3 28 7.6 40 0.5 3 2.8 15 1.1 6 18.9 100
1931 ..... 0.4 2 1.3 6 5.6 28 7.7 38 0.7 3 3.4 17 1.2 6 20.2 100
1932 .... 0.5 2 1.3 6 5.5 26. 7.3 35 0.9 5 3.8 18 1.4 7 20.8 100
1933 .... 0.9 4 1.4 7 5.3 25 6.7 32 1.3 6 3.8 18 1.6 8 20.9 100
1934 .... 1.9 9 1.6 7 5.4 25 5.9 27 1.7 8 3.7 17 1.7 8 21.8 100
1935 .... 2.9 13 1.8 8 5.8 25 5.3 23 2.0 9 3.5 15 1.9 8 23.2 100
1936 ..... 3.9 16 1.9 8 6.5 26 5.1 21 2.1 9 3.4 14 1.9 7 24.9 100
1937 ..... 4.6 18 2.0 8 7.0 27 5.2 20 2.2 8 3.4 13 1.7 7 26.2 100
1938 ..... 5.0 18 2.1 8 7.8 28 5.4 20 2.2 8 3.4 12 1.8 7 27.8 100
1939 ..... 5.4 18 2.3 8 8.5 29 5.7 19 2.1 7 3.2 11 2.0 7 29.2 100
1940 .... 5.9 19 2.5 8 9.2 30 6.0 19 2.1 7 3.1 10 2.2 7 30.8 100
1941 .... 6.8 21 2.7 8 10.2 31 6.4 20 1.9 6 2.9 9 1.8 6 32.7 100
1942 .... 9.3 27 2.6 7 10.3 30 6.7 19 1.7 5 2.7 8 1.7 5 34.9 100
1943 .... 12.5 33 2.5 7 10.5 28 6.7 18 1.4 4 2.4 6 1.8 5 37.8 100
1944 .... 16.5 40 2.2 5 10.7 26 6.7 16 1.1 3 2.1 5 1.7 4 41.1 100
1945 .... 20.6 46 2.0 4 11.1 25 6.6 15 0.9 2 2.0 4 1.7 4 44.8 100
1946 ..... 21.6 45 1.9 4 13.0 27 7.2 15 0.7 2 1.9 4 1.8 4 48.2 100
1947 .... 20.0 39 2.0 4 16.1 31 8.7 17 0.9 2 1.9 4 2.1 4 51.7 100
1948 .... 16.7 30 2.3 4 20.3 37 10.8 20 1.1 2 2.1 4 2.2 4 55.5 100
1949 .... 15.3 26 2.5 4 23.2 39 12.9 22 1.2 2 2.2 4 2.2 4 59.6 100
1950 .... 13.4 21 2.6 4 25.4 40 16.1 25 1.4 2 2.4 4 2.6 4 64.0 100
Source: Institute of Life Insurance :Lff Issunaicz FAcr Boox 151, 54, 56.
Note: Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
ments is not merely the yield on United States Governments but on foreign govern-
ments as well.
The pattern of yields is much the same as that shown for assets of all com-
panies in Table I, but the magnitude of the declines varied considerably among
the different categories. We should also note two other points. One is that the
yield obtained on the securities of private business establishments exceeded the
yield obtained on Governments by more in 195o than it did in 1929. The difference
amounted to at least 50 basis points in i95o, a spread of some consequence when
the over-all yield structure is in the neighborhood of 3 per cent. The other is that
railroad bonds, though causing much anxiety pricewise, have shown a good record
from the standpoint of interest earnings.
The i8 company study also provides some interesting data on over-all perform-
ance of bond investment-that is, interest yields plus or minus the profit or loss on
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TABLE 3
RATES OF INTEREST RETURN ON BONDS, 1929-1950
18 U. S. uFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
States and Ind'ls and
Year Gov'ts mcpls. Rails Utilities misc. Total
1929 ........... 4.56% 4.84% 4.62% 4.96% 4.66% 4.72%
1930 ........... 4.26 4.73 4.61 5.04 4.91 4.72
1931 ........... 4.24 4.60 4.55 4.95 4.92 4.65
1932 ........... 3.90 4.52 4.52 4.88 4.46 4.56
1933 ........... 3.38 4.41 4.20 4.85 4.24 4.30
1934 ........... 2.92 4.45 4.13 4.84 4.24 4.12
1935 ........... 2.67 4.31 3.89 4.78 4.03 3.82
1936 ........... 2.73 4.21 3.88 4.29 3.78 3.63
1937 ........... 2.79 4.05 3.73 4.08 3.69 3.51
1938 ........... 2.74 3.95 3.45 3.90 3.42 3.35
1939 ........... 2.73 3.96 3.51 3.64 3.46 3.32
1940 ........... 2.72 3.90 3.47 3.59 3.17 3.26
1941 ........... 2.56 3.77 3.67 3.48 2.80 3.16
1942 ........... 2.49 3.86 4.19 3.44 2.98 3.18
1943 ........... 2.47 3.78 3.76 3.40 3.09 3.00
1944 ........... 2.41 3.86 4.09 3.39 3.17 2.93
1945 ........... 2.35 4.02 4.48 3.33 3.35 2.86
1946 ........... 2.45 3.79 3.81 3.12 2.77 2.74
1947 ........... 2.45 3.85 3.88 2.97 2.81 2.74
1948 ........... 2.46 3.56 3.83 2.98 3.00 2.81
1949 ........... 2.46 3.49 3.78 3.06 3.09 2.88
1950 ........... 2.52 3.48 3.77 3.03 3.06 2.92
Av. 1929-50... 2.52 4.02 3.98 3.53 3.13 3.16
Source: Life Insurance Association of America: IsvENTzs Buw.r No. 78, App. B, Table 7. Data for 1950 and 1929-1950 averages
are taken from the files of the Investment Research Department, LIAA. Rates for the years 1929 through 1944 were based on data
obtained from Onsos H. HeRr, Tin Ivzacser Panyoa; c oi TaE EiaRsEEN I&Raxar DoMOc Len ISuRANcE CoPAsN s IN
Boans AND STocxs, 1929-1944 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1946). The Investment Research Staff of the LIAA
ba extended the series developed by Dr. Hart for the years 1945 through 1950.
Note: Data show the ratio of interest earnings to the average cost of portfolio as of the beginning and end of the year. Accrued
interest is included in portfolio.
disposal of bonds. As in the previous table, the basis of computations is cost, not
book value. Profits and losses are assumed to materialize in the year in which the
bonds are moved out of the portfolios. These data, shown in Table 4, illustrate the
remarkable ability of the life insurance companies to withstand the stresses that
sometimes arise in the capital markets. The total return on rail bonds was main-
tained very well during the i93o's when increasingly large segments of the railroad
industry were entering bankruptcy. All but terminating the net acquisition of
railroad bonds, the life insurance companies let the growth of assets reduce the
proportion in rails, watched developments in the industry, and in due time sold or
wrote off the most troublesome situations. Taking the average over the entire
period i929 through i95o, the total rate obtained by the companies on rail bonds
hardly differed from that obtained on utilities.
Dr. Raymond J. Saulnier of the staff of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, with the aid of a grant from the Life Insurance Association of America,
has produced some interesting data on mortgage loans of life insurance companies.
Saulnier used a representative sample of straight urban mortgage loans made by 24
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TABLE 4
TOTAL RATES OF RETURN ON FuNDs INVEsTED IN BONDS, 1929-1950
18 U. S. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
States and Ind'Is and
Year Gov'ts mcpls. Rails Utilities misc. Total
1929 ........... .4.56% 4.83% 4.66% 5.00% 5.01% 4.77%
1930 ........... 4.86 4.75 4.60 5.01 4.95 4.76
1931 ........... 3.42 4.61 4.52 5.39 4.98 4.70
1932 ........... 3.60 4.49 4.49 4.91 4.25 4.51
1933 ........... 3.03 4.44 4.17 4.83 4.30 4.25
1934 ........... 3.24 4.45 3.84 4.88 4.39 4.08
1935 ........... 2.79 4.30 3.92 5.47 4.43 4.02
1936 ........... 2.83 4.23 4.09 5.29 4.46 3.97
1937 ........... 2.72 3.81 3.73 4.56 3.61 3.55
1938 ........... 2.91 4.01 3.42 4.36 3.66 3.53
1939 ........... 2.80 4.00 3.46 4.12 3.93 3.49
1940 ........... 2.97 4.05 3.21 3.69 3.84 3.40
1941 ........... 2.60 3.86 2.54 3.75 3.03 3.05
1942 ........... 2.69 4.94 1.44 3.52 3.06 2.92
1943 ........... 3.16 4.95 2.70 3.57 3.11 3.31
1944 ........... 2.61 6.63 3.22 3.81 3.69 3.21
1945 ........... 2.77 7.77 6.41 4.07 4.69 3.67
1946 ........... 2.72 5.33 4.50 3.38 3.22 3.09
1947 ........... 2.60 4.40 2.77 3.09 2.91 2.78
1948 ........... 2.53 3.73 3.67 2.99 3.03 2.84
1949 ........... 2.58 3.49 3.81 3.10 3.16 2.96
1950 ........... 2.73 3.60 4.02 3.15 3.14 3.07
Av. 1929-50.. 2.73 4.51 3.75 3.77 3.34 3.32
Source: Iavns z r Bura. No. 78, op. cit. supra Table 3, at App. B, Table 10.
Note: Data show ratio of interest earnings plus profits or minus losses to tho average cost of portfolio as of the beginning and endrof
the year. Accrued interest is included in portfolio.
companies to produce a series on contractual rates for the years 192o through 1947.
These data are shown in Table 5.
The high point in the series, both for 1-4 family dwellings and for all other
property, was 1921, after which no appreciable trend developed until the z93o's.
Then, as might be expected, the contractual rate for both kinds of property began
a substantial decline. In the case of loans on 1-4 family dwellings, the decline
was from 6 per cent in 1930 to 4 per cent in 1947; for loans on all other property the
decline was from 5.9 per cent to 4 per cent.
Saulnier has also produced data on gross and net rates of mortgage income of
life insurance companies based on reports from a varying number of companies for
the years 1945 through 1947. These data have been computed since x947 by the
Investment Research Staff of the Life Insurance Association of America. Hence,
a five-year record is now available-not enough to establish trends but enough to pro.
vide considerable understanding of investment costs and the general level of yields
in recent years. The high cost of acquiring and servicing mortgage loans, par-
ticularly farm loans, absorbs a goodly proportion of the gross yields.
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TABLE 5
CONTRACT INTEREST RATES ON A SAMPLE OF STRAIGHT URBAN MORTGAGE LOANS
CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF PROPERTY, 1920-1947
24 LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
1-4 FAmnLY DWELLmNS ALL OTHER PROPERTY
Year made
Number of Average contract Number of Average contract
loans made interest rates loans made interest rates
1920 ................ 73 6.1% 13 5.8%
1921 ................ 119 6.2 16 6.5
1922 ................. 170 6.1 22 5.9
1923 ................ 209 5.9 29 5.7
1924 ................ 279 5.9 38 5.8
1925 ................ 358 5.9 42 5.4
1926 ................ 478 5.8 49 5.6
1927 ................ 414 5.9 44 5.5
1928 ................ 411 5.9 47 5.3
1929 ................ 396 6.0 56 5.7
1930 ................ 347 6.0 27 5.9
1931 ................ 299 6.0 16 5.4
1932 ................ 98 6.0 7 5.3
1933 ................ 15 5.9
1934 ................ 26 5.8 3 4
1935 ................ 64 5.5 14 5.3
1936 ................ 163 5.2 21 4.6
1937 ................ 192 5.1 22 5.1
1938 ................ 255 5.1 26 4.7
1939 ................ 285 4.9 33 4.6
1940 ................ 404 4.6 26 4.4
1941 ................ 584 4.6 38 4.3
1942 ................ 613 4.5 22 4.5
1943 ................ 459 4.5 14 4.2
1944 ................ 286 4.5 14 3.9
1945 ................ 235 4.4 18 4.2
1946 ................ 311 4.2 22 4.2
1947 ................ 72 4.0 1 4.0
Source: . J. SAxma, UaBAn MoRTaoxz LI NmNa By LiE IsuAxc ComxAms 132 (National Bureau of Economic Researchi
1950).
II
COMMERCIAL BANrs
There are series on investment yields covering all insured commercial banks as
well as all member banks of the Federal Reserve System. Although the series for all
member banks is less inclusive, the data it provides for the pre-depression years
render it more useful for a study of trends. The all-insured-commercial-bank series
goes back only to 1934.
The trend in yields for all member banks, shown in Table 7, reveals the now
familiar pattern-a substantial decline throughout the i93o's and the war years
followed by an upturn after the war. The upturn since 1945 reflects the increasing
proportion of loans in the portfolios and the highly favorable trend of loan yields.
The pattern is familiar in another respect too-like the life insurance companies
the member banks invested an increasing proportion of their funds in United States
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Government obligations during the 193o's and the war years, while during the
postwar period their holdings of United States Governments declined both absolutely
and as a proportion of total assets. The peak of Government securities holdings
was reached in 1945, amounting to 78 billion dollars. Holdings at the end of 1950
amounted to 52 billion dollars. The difficulty of finding suitable investments in
the face of the easy money programs caused cash and reserves to outdistance loans
during the middle of the I93O's, and by the end of the war United States Govern-
ment issues, generally of shorter term than those held by the life companies, ac-
counted for over half of the banks' total assets. These changes in the composition of
assets, shown in Table 8, thus brought into the banks' portfolios an increasing
proportion of low-yielding investments, and accentuated the trend brought about
by the decline in interest rates. United States Government obligations still accounted
for 36 per cent of the member banks' assets at the end of i95o.
III
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
Data on the investment earnings of mutual savings banks have been compiled
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for insured institutions only. These
appear to be the best publicly available data on investment yields of mutual savings
banks, though they are not without shortcomings. Assets of insured mutual savings
banks were only about io per cent of the assets of all mutual savings banks in 1934,
TABLE 6
AVERAGE GROSS AND NET RATES OF INCOME FROM MORTGAGE LOANS AND
REAL ESTATE SALES CONTACTS, 1945-1950
SELECTED UNITED STATES LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES
Approximate
Number of coverage of loans
Year Gross income Net income companies covered of life companies
Urban Loans
1945 ............ . 4.38% 3.77% 52 40%
1946............. 4.18 3.40 52 40
1947............. 4.07 3.19 43 50
1948 ............ 4.06 3.19 74 60
1949 ............ 4.11 3.30 75 75
1950 ............ 4.04 3.28 80 80
Farm Loans
1945 ............ 4.63% 3.74% 29 65%
1946 ............ .. 4.47 3.34 31 65
1947 ............ 4.24 2.82 21 55
1948 ............ 4.10 2.72 36 75
1949 ............ 3.98 2.67 33 80
1950 ............ 4.01 2.85 38 85
Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, and Life Insurance Association of America, Imar=sTer BuL. Nos. 53, 55, 751
76,125; and 127.
Note: Gross income data and total costs used in arriving at net income were reported on a cash not an accrual, basis. In periods of
expanding mortgage lending activity, income on a ch basin tends to be lower and costs tend to be higher than those on an accrual basf.
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TABLE 7
GROSS RATES OF INCOME ON LOANS AND SECURITIES, 1927-i95o
ALL MEMBER BANKS
Loans and securities
Year Loans Securities combined
1927 ............... 5.5% 4.7% 5.2%
1928 ............... 5.7 4.7 5.4
1929 ............... 6.1 4.7 5.7
1930 ............... 5.4 4.6 5.1
1931 ............... 5.0 4.1 4.6
1932 ............... 5.1 3.9 4.6
1933 ............... 4.7 3.5 4.1
1934 ............... 4.3 3.3 3.8
1935 ............... 4.2 2.8 3.3
1936 ............... 4.1 2.6 3.2
1937 ............... 4.0 2.6 3.2
1938 ............... 4.1 2.5 3.1
1939 ............... 4.2 2.3 3.1
1940 ............... 4.2 2.1 2.9
1941 ................ 4.0 1.9 2.7
1942 ................ 3.8 1.7 2.5
1943 ............... 3.5 1.4 1.9
1944 ............... 3.2 1.5 1.8
1945 ............... 3.0 1.5 1.8
1946 ............... 3.2 1.5 1.9
1947 ............... 3.55 1.59 2.2
1948 ............... 3.82 1.63 2.4
1949 ............... 4.04 1.66 2.5
1950 ............... 4.17 1.64 2.6
Source$: BANKING AND MonEARY STATISnCS (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington. D. C., 1943);
FZDERAL RszRv Butumn, June 1946, May 1947, May 1951. Rates for loans and securities combined were computed by the Invedt-
ment Rescarch Staff of the Life Insurance Association of America.
when this series began. Even by 1942 they accounted for only about 19 per cent
of the total. The increase in the number of insured banks in 1943-from 56 to I84-
brought their assets to 64 per cent of the total, and there has been a modest increase
since then to around 71 per cent in i95o. Thus, although yield data appear in,
Table 9 for the years 1934 through 1950, those for the years prior to 1943 probably.
are not representative of the experience of mutual savings banks as a group.
The limited period for which comparable figures are available together with the
small proportion of savings bank assets included for the years prior to 1943 makes
it difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding the trend of yields. In fact, the rates
for the earlier period, when the total number of insured mutual banks was small,
seem to reflect fluctuations in the number of banks included more than changes in
rates of income. We are probably safe in assuming, however, that the trend during
the i93o's was downward. Certainly the recovery after 1947 in the combined rate
for loans and securities has been moderate.
The rates on securities shown in Table 9 are, of course, heavily weighted by the
rate earned on United States Governments. During the 193o's and the war period,
holdings of United States Governments assumed even greater importance among
the assets of mutual savings banks than was true of the other financial institutions
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
TABLE 8
DIsTRiBUTION OF ASSETS, 1927-i95o
ALL MEMBER BANKS
(Dollar amounts in billions)
SECURITIES
Year End
U. S. States and Other Other
Gov'ts mcpls. securities Total Loans assets Total
1927 ........ $ 4.0 9% $6.4 14% $10.4 23% $23.9 54% $10.2 23% $44.5 100%
1928 ........ 4.3 9 1.4 3% $4.8 10% 10.5 22 25.2 52 12.6 26 48.3 100
1929 ........ 3.9 8 1.4 3 4.5 9 9.8 20 26.2 54 12.2 25 48.1 100
1930 ........ 4.1 9 1.7 4 5.2 11 11.0 24 23.9 51 11.5 25 46.4 100
1931 ........ 5.3 14 1.6 4 4.4 11 11.3 29 19.3 49 8.8 22 39.4 100
1932 ........ 6.5 18 1.8 5 4.0 11 12.3 34 15.2 42 8.8 24 36.2 100
1933 ........ 7.3 21 1.8 5 3.3 10 12.4 37 12.8 38 8.6 25 33.8 100
1934 ........ 10.9 27 2.0 5 3.3 8 16.1 40 12.0 30 11.9 30 40.1 100
1935 ........ 12.3 28 2.2 5 3.4 8 17.8 40 12.2 28 14.1 32 44.1 100
1936 ........ 13.5 28 2.2 5 3.9 8 19.6 40 13.4 27 15.7 32 48.7 100
1937 ........ 12.4 26 2.0 4 3.4 7 17.8 38 14.0 30 15.0 32 46.7 100
1938 ........ 13.2 27 2.4 5 3.2 6 18.9 38 13.2 27 17.3 35 49.3 100
1939 ........ 14.3 26 2.7 5 3.0 5 20.0 36 14.0 25 21.4 39 55.4 100
1940 ........ 15.8 25 3.0 5 3.0 5 21.8 35 15.3 24 25.5 41 62.7 100
1941 ........ 19.5 29 3.1 5 2.9 4 25.5 37 18.0 26 24.6 36 68.1 100
1942 ........ 37.5 44 3.0 3 2.7 3 43.2 51 16.1 19 25.7 30 84.9 100
1943 ........ 52.9 53 2.7 3 2.3 2 58.0 58 16.3 16 25.1 25 99.4 100
1944 ........ 67.7 57 2.9 2 2.3 2 72.9 61 18.7 16 27.1 23 118.7 100
1945 ........ 78.3 57 3.3 2 2.8 2 84.4 61 22.8 16 31.1 23 138.3 100
1946 ........ 63.0 50 3.5 3 3.1 2 69.7 55 26.7 21 30.9 24 127.2 100
1947 ........ 57.9 44 4.2 3 3.1 2 65.2 49 32.6 25 34.2 26 132.1 100
1948 ........ 52.2 40 4.5 3 2.9 2 59.6 45 36.1 27 35.8 27 131.4 100
1949 ....... 56.9 42 5.3 4 3.1 2 65.3 49 36.2 27 32.9 24 134.4 100
1950 ........ 52.4 36 6.6 5 3.7 3 62.7 43 44.7 31 37.2 26 144.7 100
Sources: BAreerico Am MoN. Ar STATnsIcs (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D. C., 1943);
FDRAzL RESERvE BuLerees Total asssts for 1942 through 1950 were furnished by the Federal Rmervo Bank of Now York.
Note: Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
covered in this paper. The slight upturn after 1947 in the rate on securities was due
primarily to a somewhat increased investment in other securities, largely corporate
obligations. The rates received on loans-almost exclusively mortgage loans in the
case of mutual savings banks-have been relatively favorable but it should be noted
that these rates have declined in each of the postwar years. These declines accom-
panied an expansion in mortgage investment after the war and were due in large
part to an increased proportion of mortgage loans partially or fully guaranteed by
the Federal Government.
,Changes in the investments of all mutual savings banks can be seen from Table
io." Although the Comptroller of the Currency and the National Association of
Mutual Savings Banks provide asset data for these banks for earlier years, it seemed
preferable to use the series covering all mutual savings banks compiled by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the source of earnings data for insured insti-
tutions.
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TABLE 9
GROSS RATES OF INCOME ON LOANS AND SECURITIES, 1934-1950
INSURED MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
Loans and securities
Year Loans Securities combined
1934 .................. 4.43% 4.09% 4.28%
1935 .................. 3.94 3.59 3.77
1936 .................. 3.95 3.44 3.70
1937 .................. 3.99 3.14 3.55
1938 .................. 4.36 3.13 3.73
1939 .................. 4.58 3.63 4.08
1940 .................. 4.55 3.93 4.19
1941 .................. 4.34 3.02 3.52
1942 .................. 4.67 2.98 3.62
1943 .................. 4.44 2.54 3.38
1944 .................. 4.53 2.38 3.17
1945 .................. 4.61 2.31 3.02
1946 .................. 4.58 2.35 2.97
1947 .................. 4.51 •2.34 2.94
1948 .................. 4.43 2.38 2.98
1949 .................. 4.37 2.44 3.06
1950 .................. 4.35 2.45 3.15
Source: ANNUAL REPORTS or Tim FznzAs D PoSIT INswAcE ConponAnTo. For some years rates n loans and on securities,
and forallyears rates on loans and securities combined, were computed by the Investment Research Staff of the Life Insurance Association
of America
TABLE io
DISTmBUTION OlF ASSETS, i935-I95O
ALL MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
(Dollar amounts in billions)
SECUITIES
Year End U. S. Loans and Other
Gov'ts Other Total discounts assets Total
1935 ....... $ 1.7 15% $2.9 26% $4.6 41% $5.1 46% $1.4 13% $11.2 100%
1936....... 2.2 19 2.7 24 4.9 43 5.0 44 1.5 13 11.4 100
1937....... 2.5 21 2.7 23 5.1 45 4.9 43 1.5 13 11.5 100
1938....... 2.9 25 2.4 20 5.3 45 4.9 42 1.5 13 11.6 100
1939....... 3.1 26 2.2 18 5.3 45 4.9 41 1.7 14 11.8 100
1940 ........ 3.2 27 2.1 17 5.3 44 4.9 41 1.7 15 11.9 100
1941 ....... 3.7 31 1.8 15 5.5 46 4.9 41 1.4 12 11.8 100
1942....... 4.6 38 1.5 12 6.0 50 4.7 39 1.2 10 11.9 100
1943 ........ 6.1 47 1.3 .10 7.4 57 4.5 34 1.2 9 13.1 100
1944 ........ 8.3 56 1.2 8 9.6 65 4.4 30 0.9 6 14.8 100
1945 ........ 10.7 63 1.3 7 11.9 70 4.3 25 0.8 5 17.0 100
1946 ........ 11.8 63 1.4 7 13.2 70 4.5 24 1.0 5 18.7 100
1947 ........ 12.0 61 1.7 9 13.7 69 4.9 25 1.1 5 19.7 100
1948 ........ 11.5 56 2.2 11 13.7 67 5.7 28 1.1 5 20.5 100
1949 ........ 11.4 53 2.4 11 13.8 64 6.6 31 1.1 5 21.5 100
1950 ........ 10.9 49 2.3 10 13.2 59 8.1 36 1.0 5 22.4 100
Source: ANNUAL REPORTS OP TuE FEDERAL DEaosrr I~suRAxcE COnPORATION.
Note: Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
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IV
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
There is little published data on the yields of savings and loan associations.
However, through the courtesy of the United States Savings and Loan League, yields
on mortgage loans of associations that are members of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System have been furnished for the years 1938 through 195o. The fragmentary
nature of the figures, together with changes in the number of reporting member
associations, makes data prior to 1938 unsatisfactory. It appears that there may have
been incomparability of reporting as late as 1941-1942. The League also has com-
puted yields on United States Governments beginning with 1941-these obligations
did not assume any importance in the portfolios of savings and loan associations until
i941 and after. From the yields supplied by the United States Savings and Loan
League the Investment Research Staff of the Life Insurance Association has estimated
approximate over-all yields for both mortgages and United States Governments.
These are shown in Table ii.
TABLE ii
GRoss RATES OF INCOME ON MORTGAGE LOANS AND U. S. GOVERNMENTS-
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONs-MEMBERS OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM
Mortgage loans and
Year Mortgage loans U. S. Gov'ts U. S. Gov'ts combined
(Estimated)
1938 .................. 4.85% n. a. n.a.
1939 .................. 4.98 n. a. n. a.
1940 .................. 5.44 n.a. n.a.
1941 .................. 5.58 2.87% 5.54%
1942 .................. 5.76 1.56 5.59
1943 .................. 5.51 1.62 5.08
1944 .................. 5.43 1.75 4.65
1945 .................. 5.24 1.86 4.27
1946 .................. 5.00 2.24 4.28
1947 .................. 4.79 2.30 4.33
1948 .................. 4.79 2.34 4.45
1949 .................. 4.80 2.37 4.52
1950 .................. 4.82 2.35 4.57
n. a.-not available.
Source: Rates on mortgage loans and on United States Governments were obtained from the United States Savings and Lan Leaguo
and were based on data from ANNUAL Rmpours, CO]WnMc D FnANCIAL STATEaaNTS, MZMMEns FZDZRAL HOer LOAN BAN SySmn,
Hoxu LOAN BANK BOARD. The rates for mortgages and United States Governments combined were estimated by the Investment Ro-
search Staff of the Life Insurance Association of America.
Like other financial institutions, the savings and loan associations increased their
investments in United States Governments during the war. But the proportion of
their assets thus invested never reached the levels attained by life insurance com-
panies, commercial banks, or mutual savings banks. The peak for all savings and
loan associations was about 30 per cent in 1945, and most of the remaining assets
consisted of residential mortgages. The comparatively low rates obtained on United
States Governments, particularly during the war, therefore did not unduly burden
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TABLE 12
DISTIBUTION OF ASSETS
ALL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS, 1929-1950
(Dollar amounts in billions)
Mortgage Real Government Other
Year end loans estate bonds Cash assets Total
1929 ........ $7.8 90% $0.2 3% $n. a. n. a.% $0.4 5% $0.2 3% $8.7 100%
1930 ........ 7.8 88 0.3 3 n.a. n.a. 0.5 6 0.3 3 8.8 100
1931 ........ 7.2 86 0.4 5 n.a. n.a. 0.4 5 0.4 5 8.4 100
1932 ........ 6.4 83 0.7 8 n. a. n. a. 0.3 4 0.4 5 7.8 100
1933 ........ 5.4 78 0.8 12 n. a. n.a. 0.3 5 0.4 6 7.0 100
1934 ........ 4.5 70 1.0 16 n.a. n.a. 0.3 4 0.7 10 6.4 100
1935 ........ 3.9 66 1.1 19 * ** 0.2 4 0.6 11 5.9 100
1936 ........ 3.7 65 1.1 20 * ** 0.2 4 0.6 11 5.7 100
1937 ........ 3.8 67 1.0 18 * ** 0.2 4 0.6 10 5.7 100
1938 ........ 3.9 70 0.9 17 * 1 0.2 4 0.5 9 5.6 100
1939 ........ 4.1 72 0.7 13 * 1 0.3 5 0.5 9 5.7 100
1940 ........ 4.4 76 0.5 9 0.1 1 0.3 5 0.5 8 5.8 100
1941 ........ 4.8 79 0.3 6 0.1 2 0.3 6 0.5 8 6.1 100
1942 ........ 4.8 78 0.2 3 0.3 5 0.4 7 0.4 7 6.1 100
1943 ........ 4.9 74 0.1 2 0.9 14 0.5 7 0.2 3 6.6 100
1944 ........ 5.0 67 0.1 1 1.8 24 0.4 6 0.2 3 7.5 100
1945 ........ 5.5 63 * ** 2.6 30 0.4 5 0.2 2 8.8 100
1946 ........ 7.2 71 * ** 2.0 20 0.5 5 0.4 4 10.2 100
1947 ........ 9.0 77 * ** 1.8 15 0.6 5 0.4 3 11.7 100.
1948 ........ 10.5 80 * ** 1.5 11 0.7 5 0.4 3 13.1 100
1949 ........ 11.8 80 * ** 1.5 10 0.9 6 0.5 3 14.6 100
1950 ........ 13.8 82 * ** 1.5 9 0.9 6 0.6 4 16.9 100
n. a.-not available.
.$50 million or less.
"*.5 per cent or less.
Source: United States Savings and Loan League.
Note: Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
the over-all rate of return. The net decline since 1941 in the combined rate reflects
predominantly the course of rates on mortgages, the principal investment outlet of
the associations. Table 12 indicates the importance of mortgage loans among the
assets of all savings and loan associations.
V
IMPLICATIONS
In the preceding sections considerable statistical detail regarding the trend of
investment yields of major financial institutions over the last 2 to 2-Y decades has
been reviewed. The statistics indicated declining trends beginning in some in-
stances as far back as the early 1920's, followed by modest improvement in
recent years. The downward trend was exaggerated during the 193o's and the
war period by the increasing proportion of United States Governments in the
portfolio compositions, while the improvement over the last few years is traceable
in substantial measure to the reduction in the proportion of United States Govern-
ments characteristic of most institutional portfolios. This reduction has been
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accompanied, of course, by heavy acquisition of higher-yielding corporate bonds,
mortgages, and other loans.
The implications of these trends for financial institutions can be considered under
two broad headings: (i) their effects upon investment policy and (2) their effects
upon general operating policy.
A. Investment Policy
The financial institutions responded, each in its own way, to the decline in the
trend of investment yields. The savings institutions all felt the decline during the
192o's but the reduction was gradual, did not reach very large proportions, and did
not affect all markets for loanable funds. Attention was focused on the various
limitations which encumbered the investment of life company and savings bank
assets. This developed naturally for a combination of reasons. Although the
volume of outstanding corporate indebtedness was increasing during the 1920's, the
increase was at a diminishing rate and the growth of mortgage indebtedness was
not enough to take up all of the slack. The United States Government was retiring
its indebtedness during this period. Finally, the cheapness of common stock money
to users of capital, particularly in the latter part of the decade, induced a considerable
volume of bond refunding with stock by prominent American corporations, many
of which always had harbored strong aversions to long-term debt in their capital
structures.
Accordingly, a liberalization of the New York Insurance Law was proposed, and
in 1928 was enacted into law. This amendment was the first substantial relaxation
of the limitations which had been inserted into the statutes in 19o6 following the
Armstrong Report. The amendment permitted life insurance companies domiciled
in New York State to invest up to 2 per cent of their assets in the preferred stock
of any solvent American corporation meeting certain historical standards respecting
earnings and dividends. It further limited investment in such stock to lo per cent
of the total outstanding preferred stock of any one issuing institution. Beyond
this, it permitted investment in certain unsecured obligations of American corpora-
tions.1 The New York Insurance Department observed that, "There is, of course, a
limit to the amount of government bonds that are available for investments," and
went on to explain the need for the amendment as follows:
... There is a tendency on the part of private corporations to restrict the issuance of
mortgage bonds and collateral bonds and to issue in an increasing measure preferred or
guarafiteed stbcks. It seems to be generally recognized that many of the debentures, notes
and preferred or guaranteed stocks of private corporations have as great intrinsic value
as many of the bonds secured by mortgage or collateral which are now legal investments
for life insurance companies. The relative scarcity of securities which are legal investments
for life insurance companies has been a factor in reducing the interest yield on such
1 N. Y. Laws 1928, c. 539.
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securities. The policyholders of life insurance companies are entitled to the highest yield
on the investments of their companies that is consistent with safety.2
The savings banks, investing in much the same outlets as the life companies, also
were granted broader investment outlets. In 1928 the New York State Banking
Law was amended to permit investment in certain public utility bonds, and the field
of eligible railroad obligations was broadened to include certain collateral trust
bonds, equipment trust obligations, and terminal and tunnel bonds
The amendments alleviated the mild shortage of suitable investments. Life
insurance companies domiciled in New York acquired a modest investment in pre-
ferred stocks during the remainder of i928 and added to their holdings during 1929.
Companies subject in substance to the New York Law because they were doing
business in New York State doubtless felt freer to invest in preferred stocks. The
New York savings banks, accounting for about 50 per cent of the assets of all
mutual savings banks, acquired utility bonds for the first time. But the broadened
investment laws did not arrest the declining trend of yields. It is true that the
depression materially reduced the assets of savings and loan associations, and the
statistics of the Comptroller of the Currency indicate that a slight decline in savings
bank assets also occurred in 1932 and 1933. The assets of the life insurance com-
panies, however, continued to increase, and on balance the flow of institutional funds
into the investment markets, although it dwindled for awhile, never did terminate
completely. Clearly only a substantial recovery in the private demand for capital
funds could forestall a sharp decline in interest rates, and ultimately in the invest-
ment yields being realized by the savings institutions.
As we know, this recovery did not occur, at least in any volume, until 1947. In-
vestment yields continued to decline all during the i93o's. In the meantime, it
should be noted, the depression did not leave undamaged the portfolios of the savings
institutions. A few institutions failed. Many more were occupied with the prob-
lems of a necessary financial reconstruction. Within a few years, however, many of
these problems had responded to treatment or-because of the continued growth of
institutional assets-had been reduced in relative significance, and the decline in
investment yields became perhaps the top concern of institutional management.
As the flow of savings into the institutions increased, the pressure upon investment
officers mounted. They vied with each other in seeking new outlets for their
money.
The disproportion between the flow of investment funds and the demand for
capital, which lay at the roots of the discouraging yield trends, introduced important
modifications in the investment activities of the savings institutions. In the first
place, it was a factor toward encouraging the use of direct placements which now
account for a large proportion of all the non-governmental bonds held by the life
2 STAT OF NEW YORK, SEVENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF INSURANCE, PART I
56 (Legis. Doc. No. 33) (929).
" N. Y. Laws 1928, cc. 448, 449.
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insurance companies. With institutional lenders aggressively seeking outlets for
their funds, the direct placement was a natural development. Direct negotiation,
long the practice in the settlement of mortgage and most other loans, now established
itself in the securities field. The general significance of this development is a
subject in itself, more appropriate to other papers in the symposium.
In the second place, many state legislatures were encouraged to modify further
the investment restrictions governing savings institutions. Most of these changes
were in the life insurance laws. New York amended its law in 1938 to permit the
investment of up to io per cent of assets in housing developments,4 and again
in 1946 to permit the investment of 3 per cent of assets in investment real estate.,
Finally, last spring the New York Law was amended once again, this time to permit
investment in common stocks, subject to certain qualifications, of not more than 3
per cent of assets or one-third of surplus, whichever was less.' The laws of many
states have been amended to permit a proportion of assets, usually 5 per cent, to be
invested at the discretion of the life insurance companies.
In the third place, as pointed out earlier, most financial institutions were com-
pelled for lack of suitable outlets in the private economy to place increasing amounts
of United States Government bonds in their portfolios during the 193o's and then to
add to these even more substantially as a necessary measure of war finance. But
when the war ended, there was good reason to liquidate these Government obliga-
tions and take advantage of the favorable opportunities developing in private sectors
of the economy. The situation which thus developed was one in which the financial
institutions could not escape criticism, whether they held or sold their Government
obligations. If they held the bonds, the resulting shortage of funds would have
been felt keenly in the private economy. This would have led to charges that the
financial institutions were acting in concert to raise interest rates and were not
playing their proper role in meeting the requirements of the economy for capital
funds. If they sold the bonds, they created problems for the Treasury and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, which were trying to maintain Government securities prices
without monetizing the federal debt. Possessing no authority under the law to act
in concert, and being in receipt of no direct official statement setting forth the
wishes of monetary authorities, most institutions proceeded to dispose of their
Government bonds as higher-yielding investments became available in the private
economy. Thus, the decline of yields was halted two decades or more after it
started. But the upturn has not been extensive and no one can say how long it will
continue.
The commercial banks, like savings institutions, invested increasing amounts
' N. Y. Laws 1938, c. 25. ' N. Y. Laws 1946, c. 509. ' N. Y. Laws 195r, C. 400.
7 A REPORT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLE 5, SECTION 81, OF T H NEW YoRK
INSURANCE LAw 14o Table 18 (submitted to the Joint Committee on Insurance Rates and Rcgulation of
the State of New York by the Life Insurance Association of America and the American Life Convention,
January 3o, 195).
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during the 1920's in real estate loans and corporate securities, and no doubt they too
felt the moderate decline in investment yields in these fields. However, the
largest increase in commercial bank loans from 1921 to 1929 occurred in loans for
carrying securities. Amounting to about 4 billion dollars in 1921, these loans (by
member banks) appear to have increased to over io billion dollars by the end of
1929.! The commercial banks found a ready answer to the problem of investment
outlets in this vast and expanding market.
However, this outlet was not reliable. The stock market collapsed under
the weight of speculation. Loans to carry securities then became unsuitable for
commercial bank portfolios, and soon other forms of bank loans began to decline.
The commercial banks began to buy United States Governments, and the yield trend
of their investments commenced a sharp decline. The income stream, instead of
being fed by the flow of loans into the private economy, began to be drained by
repayments. Life insurance companies found themselves supplying funds, through
policy loans and surrenders, for the purpose of liquidating bank loans.9
For a few years during the depression the commercial banks, like other institu-
tional investors, were too concerned about the uncertain outlook for loans already
on their books to worry very much about the contraction of investment outlets.
After the bank holiday in 1933, however, investment yields became a major concern
of the commercial banks just as they did in the case of the savings institutions.
Soon the commercial banks, like the insurance companies, began to make direct
loans to business. A popular procedure was for a commercial bank to take short
maturities, leaving long maturities of the same loan, or perhaps a loan senior to the
bank loan, to the life insurance companies. Other outlets, such as personal loans
and instalment credit, were explored in an effort to relieve the continuing decline in
the trend of yields. These efforts, however, proved unavailing. Except for occasional
interludes United States Government obligations continued to account for an in-
creasing proportion of the commercial bank portfolios. The yield on investments
declined to a low of 1.8 per cent, reached in 1944 and 1945.
The upturn in investment yields of the commercial banks commenced in 1946
a little earlier than it did for the savings institutions. As indicated in Table 8,
the banks, like the savings institutions, had an exceptionally large proportion of
their assets invested in United States Governments when the war ended. Hence,
the appearance of a strong demand for capital funds in the private economy en-
couraged the banks to seek higher investment yields by disposing of their United
States Governments and investing the proceeds in business loans, real estate loans, and
other forms of private credit. The commercial banks, however, are not merely in-
'See BANKING Amm Mo NETARY STATISTeS, Tables 19 and 22 (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Washington, D. C. 1943). Comparable statistics do not seem to be available for the
entire period.
IROCEEDINGS or THE TwaTsrr-SiETn ANNUAL CoNVENTION oF THE AssocIATIN OF LIFE INSURANCE
PRESIDENTS 8 7 (1932).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
vestment institutions; they also furnish a large part of the nation's money supply.
The shift in investment policy in 1946, therefore, had broad economic consequences,
leading ultimately to a major change in monetary and debt management policy
of the Government. The circumstances leading up to this change call for a few
comments at this point.
Unlike the savings institutions, when the commercial banks lend, they increase
their deposits and therefore expand the nation's money supply. This process can
continue as long as the banks possess the necessary reserves. But commercial
bank reserves can be augmented by the sale of Government obligations to the Fed-
eral Reserve System and the System was committed at the end of the war to support
the price of these obligations. It was recognized that the commercial banks could
augment their reserves at will under these circumstances, and that the sale by non-
bank holders of marketable debt which found its way into the Federal Reserve Banks
also would increase commercial bank reserves. The debt management policy of the
Treasury throughout the postwar period, therefore, has emphasized the retirement
of marketable debt held by the banks, using for the purpose funds obtained from
taxation and the sale of savings bonds to the non-bank public.
Prior to the outbreak of the Korean war the debt management policy of the
Treasury and the investment policies of the commercial banks adjusted themselves
to each other in a reasonably satisfactory manner. Indeed, from the end of 1946
through June 30, I95O, the Treasury redeemed about 21 billion dollars of marketable
debt, an amount well in excess of the 16 billion dollars of net disposals by the com-
mercial banks and the principal savings institutions.10 The Federal Reserve, al-
though supporting the price of United States Governments and hampered by a
substantial inflow of gold, was able over this period to effect a reduction in its port-
folios and thus to retain control of member bank reserves. Meantime, the member
banks added about 14 billion dollars to their capital and surplus. These funds, to-
gether with the proceeds of Government bond disposals and an increase in time
deposits, permitted them to lend 13.7 billion dollars to the general public while
increasing demand deposits by only 3.3 billion dollars. Thus, prior to the Korean
war, the debt management program functioned with reasonable smoothness and
on the whole it facilitated the investment programs of the commercial banks.
The outbreak of the Korean war upset the delicate monetary balance the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve had maintained throughout most of the postwar period.
The public, fearful of a new era of shortages, went on a buying spree, particularly
in the durable goods and housing fields. Savings deposits were drawn down. Re-
demption of Series E bonds exceeded sales. Increasing amounts of instalment
credit and mortgage credit were sought from the financial institutions. The financial
institutions in turn sought funds through the sale of Government obligations. Al-
"See Treasury survey of ownership of federal securities, Treasury Bulletin, March, 1947, P. 49, and
id., September, 1950, p. 33.
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though the Treasury, benefiting from a tax rise, continued to redeem its marketable
debt, it could not keep up with these sales. The bonds, therefore, backed up in the
Federal Reserve portfolios and caused member bank reserves to increase. The
Federal Reserve could no longer sterilize the inflationary effects of the bond support
program. The necessary adjustment came with the well-known accord between
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve last March, whereby rigid support of bond
prices was abandoned in favor of a more flexible arrangement designed to maintain
an orderly Government bond market.
B. Operating Policy
The declining trend of yields had important effects upon the operating as well
as the investment policies of the financial institutions. In the life insurance field
the effects were primarily on the actuarial side of the business. As the decline per-
sisted, life insurance companies reluctantly reduced the dividend rate on outstanding
policies and the rate of interest guaranteed in new policies. These actions tended,
of course, to make life insurance more expensive to policyholders than otherwise
would have been the case. Declining yields likewise required mutual savings banks
to take a similar course of action-namely, to reduce the rate of interest paid on
savings accounts.
In the commercial bank field resort was had to so-called "activity charges" on
checking accounts and the sale of checks for small accounts. Beyond this, dividend
payments to stockholders were drastically curtailed in the early i93o's and while
some improvement has occurred since the war the rates on most bank stocks are
still comparatively low. This has placed bank stocks at a disadvantage with stocks
of other enterprises and has made it difficult for banks to attract the capital needed
to support the great wartime expansion in bank deposits.
VI
SUMMARY
This article has traced the trend of investment yields of major financial institutions
during the past few decades and has considered some of the important implications
of this trend. During the major part of the past few decades the investment yields of
institutions have been declining due primarily to an inadequate demand for capital
funds and an easy money policy by Government. All institutions have experienced
an upturn in yields in the period following World War II due to the huge demand
for corporate capital and mortgage funds.
The prolonged downward trend in yields had many important implications for
financial institutions, both from the viewpoint of their investment policy and their
general operating policy. All of the institutions were obliged to seek new outlets
for their funds in higher-yielding investments, and this gradually required a loosening
of state laws restricting institutional investments. The declining trend of yields
tended to increase the net cost of life insurance and lowered the rate of return paid
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on savings deposits. It also reduced the dividends paid on commercial bank stocks
and led to the introduction of service charges by the banks. Finally, it caused all
financial institutions at the end of the war to look for higher-yielding replacements
for a large proportion of their Government bond holdings, producing problems for
the monetary authorities and leading ultimately to a change in monetary policy.
American economists have become accustomed to thinking of interest as a
cost to society-a cost to taxpayers through interest on the public debt, a cost to
home owners, a cost to corporate borrowers. A prime consideration of the Govern-
ment's easy money policy has been to reduce the interest cost to society. Little
attention has been paid until recently to interest as a source of income to society.
Looked at in this light, reduced interest rates have penalized the millions of savers
who are the ultimate owners of the assets of life insurance companies, savings banks,
and other financial institutions. An appreciation of interest as a source of income
as well as a cost to society may lead to a reconsideration of some of the factors that
have been influential in guiding the Government towards an easy money policy.
